Union participation in the conclusion of socioeconomic pacts during democratic transitions and, more generally, in the process of democratic consolidation, is characterized by an interesting paradox. Trade unions and political parties are the organiz... Read more

Union participation in the conclusion of socioeconomic pacts during democratic transitions and, more generally, in the process of democratic consolidation, is characterized by an interesting paradox. Trade unions and political parties are the organizations with the most to gain from the establishment and consolidation of a democratic regime. The interests of these groups cannot be satisfied outside a democratic regime, and their fulfilment often entails a strengthening of democratic institutions. In particular, unions that can count on a mass following should become the most loyal supporters of a democratic regime, where the weight of numbers gives them the chance to compete successfully to defend their interests. My investigation, however, suggests that relatively weak unions have often played a very important role in the process of democratic consolidation, and engaged in policies of economic stabilization that have critically benefited the new democratic regime. Stronger unions, on the other hand, have often been entirely hostile to these processes, and have created the risk of potentially catastrophic confrontations with elected governments. In order to unravel this puzzle, I undertake a comparative analysis of 15 democratic transitions in different parts of the world over the 1973-1989 period, and discuss in more detail the cases of Spain, Argentina and Bolivia. Less